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Adjudicating National Convention Delegate
Selection Disputes: Prospects For The Development
of Democratic Party Law
[Tihe national convention is part and parcel of the magic by
which men rule. It is a great ceremony symbolizing an expression
of the will of the mass of party membership. . . . That the convention may not, in fact, constitute a precision instrument for
gauging and expressing the "will" of the rank and file of the party
is, in one sense, immaterial. It works; it arrives at acceptable decisions, at least most of the time.'
The Guidelines we have adopted are designed to open the door to
all Democrats who seek a voice in their Party's most important
decision: the choice of its presidential nominee . . . . We believe
that popular control of the Democratic Party is necessary for its
2
survival.
If the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to National Political Party Conventions were left to state law "each of the fifty states
could establish the qualifications of its delegates to the various
party conventions without regard to party policy, an obviously
intolerable result". . . . Such a regime could seriously undercut or
indeed destroy the effectiveness of the National Party Convention
as a concerted enterprise engaged in the vital process of choosing
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates-a process which
usually involves coalitions cutting across state lines. The Convention serves the pervasive national interest in the selection of candidates for national office, and this national interest is greater than
3
any interest of an individual State.
Two weeks before the 1972 Democratic National Convention assembled in Miami, Florida, the Convention Credentials Committee
had before it 82 challenges from 31 delegations. Twenty-three chal1.
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KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE

GROUPS 475 (3rd ed. 1952).

A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PARTY
SELECTION 49 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MANDATE FOR REFORM].
3. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 490 (1975).

STRUCTURE AND DELEGATE

1972 DEMOCRATIC NA(1972) [hereinafter cited as OF THE PEOPLE]. Credentials challenge procedures were governed by detailed quasi-judicial rules, including notice of intent to challenge,
answer, appointment of a hearing officer, hearings, filing of findings of fact to be submitted
to the Committee no later than 32 days before the Convention opened, filing of exceptions to
the hearing officer's rulings, consideration by the Credentials Committee not later than 2
weeks before the Convention, and preparation and distribution of the Committee's report up
to 48 hours before the Convention. Concurrence of 10 percent of the Committee members was
required to submit a minority report to the plenary Convention. Challenges unresolved by
the Committee went to the Convention for final resolution. See THE OFFICIAL CALL FOR THE
1972 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION 16-24 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1972 CALL].
4.

OF THE PEOPLE, REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE TO THE

TIONAL CONVENTION
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lenges from fifteen states, unresolved by the Committee, were settled on the floor of the convention itself.5 Since final resolution of
credentials disputes could determine the choice of the party's presidential nominee, the stakes were high and power politics prevailed
over any thought of dispassionate deliberation. 6
The proliferation of challenges was attributable to the development of an elaborate set of party rules implementing a 1968 Convention mandate. That mandate called for reform of convention delegate selection procedures and required state Democratic parties to
give all Democratic voters a full, meaningful, and timely opportunity to participate in the selection of delegates. 7 Implementation of
the mandate produced guidelines designed to remedy circumstances
in which meaningful participation of Democratic voters in the
choice of their presidential nominee was "often difficult or costly,
sometimes completely illusory, and, in not a few instances, impossible." ' By committing itself through an enactment of the 1968
Convention to a national party policy assuring that delegate selection processes would be democratized, the national party assumed
unprecedented control over state party practices.'
5. See R. BAIN AND J. PARRIS, CONVENTION DECISIONS AND VOTING RECORDS 332 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BAIN AND PARRIS].
6. Reviewing credentials contests several weeks after the Convention, the National Party
Chairman remarked, "Everyone can agree on rhetoric and words when you get to a thing like
the platform. But when you're talking about credentials-credentials mean cold stiff votes,
and that's real power." T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972 161 (1973).
7. MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 9. See also Vining, Delegate Selection Reform
and the Extension of Law Into Politics, 60 VA. L. REV. 1389 (1974); Schmidt and Whalen,
Credentials Contests at the 1968-and 1972-DemocraticNational Conventions, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1438, 1446-61 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schmidt and Whalen]; Segal, Delegate Selection Standards: The Democratic Party's Experience, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873 (1970).
8. MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 10. The Commission on Party Structure and
Delegate Selection [hereinafter referred to as 1969 Commission] was appointed in 1969 by
the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee to implement the 1968 Convention
mandate. The Commission included public office-holders, party officials, labor leaders, and
civil rights organizers, among others. Implementation of the guidelines recommended by the
Commission was to be a joint effort of the state and national party. Id. at 15-16. In April,
1970, the Democratic National Committee adopted the guidelines as the standards with
which state parties, in qualifying and certifying delegates to the 1972 Convention, were
required to make all efforts to comply. 1972 CALL, supra note 4, at 12.
9. Since its inception, the national convention has been the policy-making body of our
political parties. The adoption and implementation of national standards for delegate selection was in itself an expression of party policy. See BAIN AND PARRIS, supra note 5, at 1-3. In
December 1974, a charter was adopted at Kansas City, Mo. by the Conference on Democratic
Policy and Organization which had been charged with that responsibility by the 1972 Convention. Art. 2, § 2 states:
The National Convention shall be the highest authority of the Democratic Party,
subject to the provisions of this Charter. The National Convention shall recognize
the state and other Parties entitled to participate in the conduct of the national
affairs of the Democratic Party, including its convention, conferences, and committees.
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THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICTS

Methods of selecting delegates to national party nominating conventions reflect the federal character of our national government.
State delegate selection systems have been as varied as the local
practices and customs which created them.' 0 The national party
guidelines" generated by the 1968 Convention mandate for reform
of delegate selection superimposed on state party procedures minimum standards of fairness which state parties were expected to
meet. Even though the guidelines were viewed as binding on state
parties, the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection12 lacked direct enforcement powers. However, the guidelines'
status as party law derived from the Commission's posture as the
agent of the 1968 Convention and from the power of the 1972 Credentials Committee 3 to recommend sanctions for non-compliance
with those rules. 4 Significantly, since there was no mechanism for
monitoring compliance with the rules before the delegate selection
process began, they were enforced through credentials challenges
and the party's ultimate sanction of refusing to seat non-complying
delegates at the national convention. 5
The stage was thus set for inevitable clashes between the national
rules and delegates selected according to state law or state party
custom found to violate those rules. Resolution of these conflicts in
1972 raised legal questions concerning the relationship between the
national party and state parties, culminating in the United States
Supreme Court ruling that when the qualifications of delegates to
be seated at a national nominating convention are at issue, national
party rules will supersede state law:
If the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to National Political Party Conventions were left to state law each of the fifty states
could establish the qualifications of its delegates to the various
CHARTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES

(1974) [hereinafter cited as PARTY

CHARTER].
MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 17-20.
11. See note 8supra.
12. Id.
13. The Credentials Committee was empowered by the Democratic National Committee,
which in turn derived its authority from the preceding convention, to determine and resolve
questions concerning the seating of delegates; it reported its findings to the 1972 Convention
for final resolution. 1972 CALL, supra note 4, at 13.
14. MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 36-37.
15. The 1976 rules expressly provide for monitoring and compliance review prior to the
filing of formal challenge procedures. DELEGATE SELECTION RULES FOR THE 1976 DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL CONVENTION 13, issued by the Democratic National Committee, March, 1975
[hereinafter cited as 1976 DELEGATE RULES].

10.
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party conventions6 without regard to party policy, an obviously
intolerable result.
A system of party law is now evolving which will be based on the
Party Charter and the by-laws adopted pursuant to that Charter.' 7
This unique attempt to submit a political party to the governance
of law has accelerated the interaction of constitutional, legal, and
policy considerations. This article will examine that interaction
through analysis of real and potential conflicts between the associational rights of the party and other constitutional rights which party
rules and their enforcement may invade; and of clashes between
national party rules and state law or state party custom. Settlement
of disputes arising from these conflicts brings into focus the tensions
inherent in the party's dual role as consensus-builder among its
constituent groups and as adjudicator of delegate selection disputes.
The article is premised on the proposition that national political
parties should be allowed to perform their vital functions of compromising interests, reconciling differences and choosing presidential
nominees free from judicial intervention. The proper sphere for resolution of intra-party disputes is not the courtroom but party procedures providing for impartial adjudication based on known rules
promulgated in advance by the national party.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:

The National Nominating Convention
The national nominating convention developed extraconstitutionally and extra-legally to fill a void in our governmental
system, providing a means for uniting widely scattered points of
political leadership in support of candidates for the Presidency.
Entirely the product of custom, the convention system developed
from two earlier methods of choosing a President: before the rise of
political parties, the nomination and election procedures were
16. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 490 (1975). This decision emerged from the most
celebrated of the 1972 credentials contests, involving the unseating of 59 delegates from
Illinois, including Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago. It was determined by the hearing officer,
the Credentials Committee, and the Convention that the delegates had failed to comply with
certain party rules. Id. at 477-83.
17. The Delegate Selection Rules incorporated into the Call for the 1976 Convention will
govern until the 1976 Convention adjourns. The Charter may be amended by vote of a
majority of the delegates to the national convention or by vote of two-thirds of the members
of the Democratic National Committee. See Resolution of Adoption and Implementation, and
art. 12, sec. 1, PARTY CHARTER, supra note 9. The by-laws are designed to fill in the gaps where
the Charter is not explicit and can be amended by a majority vote of the National Convention
or of the Democratic National Committee. BY-LAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED
STATES, adopted by the Democratic National Committee, October 14, 1975 [hereinafter cited
as PARTY BY-LAWS].
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merged in the electoral college. The electors were to meet in their
respective states and vote for the President by ballots which were
forwarded to the national government. 8 When constitutional provisions proved inadequate, they were supplemented by the use of
congressional caucuses to nominate presidential candidates. By
1832 public national conventions nominated the presidential and
vice-presidential candidates of both political parties. While evolution was in the direction of popular participation in the process of
selecting delegates, the convention also became a mechanism
through which widely dispersed party leaders could negotiate and
compromise on a presidential choice. However, the Constitution
expressly provided for neither popular election of presidential electors nor control of presidential nominations by political parties. 9
The States' Role in Nominating and Electing the President
Although the Constitution is silent on a method of nominating
presidential candidates, article II, section 1 gives to the state legislatures the power to direct the manner of selecting presidential electors." The twelfth amendment prescribes the process by which these
electors shall meet to choose the President and Vice-President in
their respective states,2 but state legislatures retain exclusive power
2
to direct the manner in which these electors shall be selected. 1
While the constitutional mandate of the states in the selection
of presidential electors is clear, the states' role in the presidential
nominating process is not. Pervasive state regulation of the electoral
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 provides that:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives
to which the State may be entitled in the Congress ....
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two
Persons of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with
themselves ...
This system was defended by Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST, No. 68, on the theory
that the selection of the President should be by a small number of persons "most capable of
analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favourable to
deliberation..." Wesleyan University Press, 1961 at 458.
19. See P. DAVID, R. GOLDMAN, R. BAIN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS
39-64 (1964) [hereinafter cited as DAVID, GOLDMAN, BAIN]; V.0. KEY, POLTCS, PARTIES, &
PREsSURE GRouPs 396-98 (5th ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as KEY]; Bain and Parris, supra
note 5, at 11-19.
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
22. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). The Supreme Court analyzed the methods by which the states choose presidential electors and concluded that the legislative history
of art. 11, sec. 1 indicated that state power was intended to be broad. The state legislatures
could "appoint" electors directly or through popular election or "as otherwise might be
directed." Id. at 28.
18.
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process2 has been justified by state interests in protecting the integrity of elections, in guaranteeing state citizens the right of effective
suffrage, and in facilitating the election of public officials.' 4 Although this power of the states to regulate voting procedures is
beyond dispute, it must be exercised within constitutional limita25
tions .
Delegates to national nominating conventions are currently selected from the individual states. However, there appears to be no
constitutional impediment to restructuring the presidential nominating system. The Supreme Court in Cousins v. Wigoda2 supported this proposition: "[t]he States themselves have no constitutionally mandated role in the great task of the selection of Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates. 21 7 The Court, however, distinguished between the interests of a state in the regulation of elections for public office and the interest of a state in regulation of the
process by which delegates are selected to a national party nominating convention. Even though in Cousins the challenged delegates
were chosen in a state primary election, the Court viewed the state
interest as less compelling than the right of a political party to be
free to make and enforce its own rules for the selection of national
convention delegates. The importance of the task performed by such
delegates, the Court reasoned, and "the special function of delegates
to such a Convention militate[d] persuasively against the conclusion that the asserted interest constitute[d] a compelling state
interest."28
While concurring with the majority that the state interest in protecting its electoral processes for primary delegate selection was
insufficient to overcome the constitutional right of a political party
to set its own standards for selecting convention delegates, Mr. Justice Rehnquist refused to downplay the legitimacy of the state inter23. See KEY, supra note 19, at 617-22 for the principal types of state regulation.
24. See Brief for Respondents at 25, Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) citing Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,562 (1964); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1970).
25. The Constitution gives to the states the power to prescribe the "Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I. § 4; the
states' power to regulate state elections is reserved to the states by the tenth amendment
except as limited by the fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fourth amendments.
See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-26 (1970). See also Note, Developments in the
Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1115-21 (1975).
26. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
27. Id. at 489-90.
28. Id. at 489.
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est.2 He inferred that the states might have residual constitutional
authority, presumably under the tenth amendment,0 to regulate
the process by which presidential candidates are nominated. Such
a reservation of state regulatory rights, however, would seem inconsistent with the fact that parties have historically been free to adopt
alternative mechanisms for making presidential nominations in
which the states had no role. 3 1 Furthermore, proposals repeatedly
appear to nominate presidential candidates by regional or national
32
primaries in which the states would not be an electoral unit at all.
Although the applicability of state law to the regulation of the
manner of selecting delegates is not disputed when a party chooses
to use state election machinery, that authority does not extend to
determining the eligibility or qualifications of delegates to be seated
at a convention. 3 Rather, the decision to adopt and enforce national
standards for delegate selection is solely a matter of party policy,
arrived at within the political process and constitutionally protected
through freedom to associate for the advancement of shared politi3
cal goals.
Freedom of Association and PoliticalParty Activity
Freedom to associate with others for the common advancement
of political beliefs is a right firmly grounded in the first and fourteenth amendments. It is viewed as a fundamental right protected
from encroachment by federal and state governments. 5 Since the
effective operation of democratic government is built on the premise
that its citizens should be free to express their political beliefs
through association with a political party, any interference with a
29. Id. at 492 (Chief Justice Burger and Mr. Justice Stewart joined in this concurring
opinion).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. X states that:
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
31. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text. See also DAVID, GOLDMAN, BAIN, supra
note 19, at xiii; KEY, supra note 19, at 412; Blumstein, Party Reform, the Winner-Take-All
Primary, and the CaliforniaDelegate Challenge: The Gold Rush Revisited, 25 VAND. L. REV.
975, 988 (1972) for the view that parties have chosen to focus their procedures for the selection
of delegates to national conventions on the states only for reasons of convenience; that if the
national parties should choose some other geographical unit for purposes of delegate selection,
the Constitution would not impede them.
32. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 490 n.9 (1975).
33. Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
34. See notes 35 through 38 infra and accompanying text. See also Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. 477, 487, 496 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
35. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973).
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political party's freedom is an interference with the freedom of its
adherents." Freedom to advance shared political principles implies
the right to effectuate those principles within the confines of the
Constitution. A party, for example, may require candidates, for Presidential Elector to pledge to support the nominees of the Party's
national convention; such a pledge is a legitimate method of"securing party candidates in the general election, pledged to the philosophy and leadership of that party." 7 Similarly, a political party may
adopt rules for its own governance and standards for the selection
of delegates to its national convention to effectuate national party
philosophy substantially free from governmental intrusions.
Although freedom of parties to adopt and act upon common principles and policies is broad, it is not absolute. 8 It may conflict with
legitimate state regulation of electoral procedures or it may be subject to restraint when party activity is shown to infringe other constitutional rights. Thus, while the power of a state to regulate political party activity is limited by first amendment associational rights,
freedom to associate in pursuit of common beliefs may under certain
circumstances be limited in turn by the constitutional rights of
individual voters.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON POLITICAL PARTIES

State Primary Elections
The courts have traditionally been reluctant to intervene in
"[v]ital rights of association guaranteed by the Constitution."3 9
This non-intervention policy has been abandoned, however, in special cases when state parties have been found to be involved in racial
discrimination. In the White Primary Cases of the 1940's and
1950's,40 the Supreme Court dealt with racially discriminatory practices of state political groups. It examined the relationship between
official state action and practices alleged to violate the fifteenth
amendment." In one instance, the Court found that even though the
36. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
37. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 227 (1952).
38. See Note, Freedom of Associationand the Selection of Delegates to NationalPolitical
Conventions, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 148 (1970).
39. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972); see also Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party of Minnesota, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968); Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir.
1965). But see Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D.
Wash. 1970).
40. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
41. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1 provides:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.
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nominees for the general election were selected by state party convention, state regulation of the process made the party an agency
of the state for purposes of the primary.2 In another case, the Court
found state action in the exclusion of blacks from the pre-primary
elections of an organization of all white voters conducted as if it were
a political party.' 3 The organization's candidates had consistently
run unopposed in the Democratic primary and the general election.
Therefore, victory in the pre-primary election was tantamount to
election to office. In finding that the fifteenth amendment had been
violated, the Court noted that the very purpose of the association's
primary was to exclude blacks from participating in the state primary.
The White Primary Cases, however, should not necessarily be
read to imply a general principle that any action of a political party
is governmental action, subjecting the party activity to federal constitutional scrutiny by courts." Since the prohibitions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments apply only to governmental acts,
the crucial inquiry must be to what extent the allegedly unconstitutional party activity is related to powers traditionally exercised by
the state or federal government. Since the White Primary Cases
were concerned with application of the fifteenth amendment only,
it is necessary to look beyond invidious discrimination in state primaries to other party activities which might be restrained by the
fourteenth amendment. Whether the court will intervene in disputes involving national convention delegate selection will depend
upon whether that process is viewed as governmental action or as
the activity of a private association, protected from governmental
intrusions.
W4hat Action Is State Action?
The current state of the law in this area is uncertain. Decisions
of the federal circuit courts differ, and the Supreme Court has not
yet directly addressed the issue of whether national political party
activity qualifies as governmental action. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Irish v. Democratic-Farmer42.
43.

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The Court found that
[t]he evil here is that the State, through the action and abdication of those whom
it has clothed with authority, has permitted white voters to go through a procedure
which predetermines the legally devised primary.
Id. at 477.
44. See Kester, ConstitutionalRestrictionson PoliticalParties,60 VA. L. REV. 735, 75557 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kester].
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Labor Party of Minnesota," dismissed a complaint of malapportionment of county, district, and state conventions, refusing to interfere
with the discretion of the delegates. In Lynch v. Torquato,46 voters
brought suit against a Democratic county committee to require election of the county chairman by popular vote. In dismissing that
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held:
[T]he citizen's constitutional right to equality as an elector . . .
applies to the choice of those who shall be his elected representative in the conduct of government, not in the internal management
of a political party. It is true that this right extends to state regulated and party conducted primaries. However, this is because the
function of primaries is to select nominees for governmental office
even though, not because, they are party enterprises. . . . [Tihe
normal role of party leaders in conducting internal affairs of their
party, other than primary or general elections, does not make their
party offices governmental offices or the filling of these offices state
action . . ..
In addition, a United States District Court also declined to intervene in an action brought by members of the Georgia Democratic
Party alleging unconstitutional apportionment of the state committee which chose national convention delegates. The court held that
it lacked jurisdiction over the internal management of a political
party. 8 However, in Maxey v. Washington State Democratic
Committee4 involving the national delegate selection process, the
one-person, one-vote principle was held applicable to the selection
of delegates to state and national conventions. The court reasoned
that the nominating phase of a state-created presidential election
process was a critical one, and found that, therefore, the delegate
selection process required close constitutional scrutiny.
When the delegate selection process for the 1972 national conventions began, the question of whether national party action was state
action had not been settled. The United States Court of Appeals for
45. 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968).
46. 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965).
47. Id. at 372 (emphasis added). See also Dahl v. Republican State Committee, 319 F.
Supp. 682 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (holding that election of state committeemen is not an integral
part of the state-created process and therefore not subject to equal protection limitations of
one-person, one-vote).
48. Smith v. State Exeutive Comm. of Dem. Party of Ga., 288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga.

1968).
49. 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970). The court viewed Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944) and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) as dispositive of the issue of state action,
even though the facts were clearly distinguishable: no invidious discrimination was involved
and the claim related to national convention delegates rather than to the nomination in a
state primary of state officials.

384
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the District of Columbia became the focus of national convention
credentials disputes, and the court found requisite state action in
cases involving the Democratic Party's delegate-allocation formulas. ° Citing the White Primary Cases as precedent, 5 it analyzed the
states' role in conducting general elections at which presidential
electors are chosen and concluded that party nomination procedures
are integrally related to the subsequent general election. 2 In ruling
that national delegate-allocation decisions constitute state action,
the court failed to give any weight to the right of a voluntary association to advance its own political interests by utilizing a delegate
formula of its choosing.53
The Democratic Party's delegate selection rules were the basis for
credentials challenges immediately preceding the 1972 Convention,
in which the issue of state action was once again germane. In Brown
v. O'Brien54 the District of Columbia Circuit Court decided that
fourteenth amendment claims were applicable to the enforcement
of party rules, but it cast little light on state action analysis. The
court examined the assertion of unseated delegates from California
that they had been denied due process of law by the action of the
Convention Credentials Committee, 5 and concluded without further explanation that the national party's action was state action.
It reasoned that since the delegates' expulsion was based on a retroactive application of party rules, the Credentials Committee had
acted in violation of fundamental principles of due process. Similarly, in the Illinois dispute,56 the court again adopted the reasoning
50. Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 858 (1971) and Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
51. Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bode v.
National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302, 1304 at n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52. Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
53. But see Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, Civil No. 74-1358 (D.C.
Cir., Sept. 30, 1975), 44 U.S.L.W. 2161 (Oct. 14, 1975).
54. Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir.), stay granted 409 U.S. 1 (1972). The Brown
case was a consolidation of two suits by ousted California and Illinois delegates.
55. Id. at 567. The California plaintiffs were 151 of 271 delegates elected in accordance
with state law and with the rules of the California Democratic Party which gave the winner
of a plurality of the delegates the state's entire delegation. The Credentials Committee
recommended that 151 of those delegates be unseated and that those seats be allocated to
the candidates who had together received a total of 56 percent of the vote in the California
primary. California had previously received assurances from party officials that the winnertake-all would not violate the party rules for 1972. See OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 4, at 3133.
56. Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 571 (D.C. Cir.), stay granted, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). The
Illinois plaintiffs, 59 delegates elected according to state law, were judged by the Credentials
Committee to have been selected in violation of party rules; the plaintiffs were unseated and
replaced by another group of delegates who had not been elected according to state law. See
OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 4, at 41.
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of the White Primary Cases- It found the process by which candidates for an office are endorsed an integral part of the election itself,
5
and applied that principle to the choosing of convention delegates.
Such a broad analogy to the White Primary Cases ignores the crucial factual distinctions between those cases and the application of
fourteenth amendment restraints to the presidential nominating
59
procedures of national political parties.
The Supreme Court's only articulation of whether constitutional
restrictions should be applied in this context was an indirect one. 0
It may, however, serve as an indication of the Court's probable
position on judicial intervention in internal party matters. In staying the decision of the circuit court in Brown v. O'Brien,"'the Court
noted an absence of authority supporting the action of the lower
court in intervening in the
internal determination of a national political party. . . regarding
the seating of delegates. . . . [N]o holding of this Court up to
now gives support for judicial intervention in the circumstances
presented here, involving as they do relationships of great delicacy
that are essentially political in nature. . . . Judicial intervention
in this area traditionally has been approached with great caution
62
and restraint.
The Court distinguished the White Primary Cases, noting that the
case it was considering was not one arising from invidious racial
discrimination in a primary contest within a single state. 3 While
entertaining "grave doubts" as to the action taken by the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court was unwilling to undertake final resolution of the constitutional questions presented. Without adequate
time for deliberation, the majority did not suggest another test for
state action when enforcement of a political party's delegate selection standards is at issue. 4
57. See notes 40 through 43 supra and accompanying text.
58. 469 F.2d 563, 572.
59. See Kester, supra note 44, at 757.
60. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
61. 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
62. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972). Soon after the Court's decision in O'Brien,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in Republican State Central Committee of Arizona v. Ripon Society,
Inc., 409 U.S. 1222 (1972), stayed a United States District Court injunction prohibiting the
Republican Convention from allocating "bonus" delegates to its 1976 Convention, relying on
the rationale of O'Brien.
63. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 n.1.
64. Id. at 5. Mr. Justice Marshall issued a strong dissent, agreeing with the court of
appeals that party action was governmental action in the context of a national nominating
convention where delegates are elected in a state primary. Arguing that since the state
recognizes and adopts the primary results by giving political parties automatic access to the
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Although it could be argued that the threshold for finding state
action may be lower when party practices are found to involve racial
discrimination, no court has expressed a rational basis for making
this factor the distinguishing one. When determining the applicability of fourteenth amendment restraints, the critical distinctions between state primary cases and those involving national convention
delegate selection lie elsewhere. First, a court should examine the
degree to which nominating procedures are equivalent to election to
office. It is noteworthy that the White Primary Cases concerned
situations in which the significant contest for office occurred in the
primary or pre-primary and not in the general election. Voters foreclosed by racial discrimination from participating in the primary
were foreclosed from an effective choice in the election, because
nomination was, for all practical purposes, equivalent to election.
Selection of delegates to a national nominating convention, however, concerns the choice of those who will later choose the party's
nominee for President. This initial stage is several steps removed
5
from the actual election of the President.1
Second, the inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close
relationship between the state or national government and the challeged action of a private association, so that the activity of the latter
may fairly be treated as that of the state. Courts have had no difficulty finding state action where a private entity exercises powers
"traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."6 The Supreme
Court has held, however, that the individual states have no constigeneral election ballot, the primary has been "infused with state action," and the claimants
were therefore entitled to judicial resolution of their constitutional claims. Id. at 13. When
the Supreme Court later resolved the issue of whether national party rules supersede state
law in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), state action was not at issue because the case
was before the Court on appeal from a state court injunction still in effect against the
challengers. See notes 79 through 83 infra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 20 through 26 supra and accompanying text. See also Riddell v. National
Democratic Party, 344 F. Supp. 908, 923 (S.D. Miss. 1972), in which the court discussed the
distinction between the role of the national convention nominating process and the presidential election:
• . . [The] National Democratic Party being only a political organization and
carrying with it only the right and power to select candidates and not the absolute
power to elect them, the vast number of individuals who were deprived of the direct
voice in nominating a candidate . . . are still not without right to vote for or reject
those individuals selected as candidates for them. . . . [T]he national organization takes its political risk . ..
[T]he uninvited or denied members have their veto voice at the polls, if they
are dissatisfied with the choice . . ..
66. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). In Jackson, the Court
held that where the state has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice "by
ordering it," private action is not transformed into state action merely because the state
regulates the activity involved.
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tutionally mandated role in the presidential nominating process. 7
Since the rules for choosing delegates to serve at national party
68
conventions is protected by first amendment rights of association,
the states' role, if any, may be abrogated if the parties decide to
choose their presidential nominees without utilizing state election
machinery.69 When, as a convenience, a party makes use of automatic access to the state primary ballot, the resulting state regulation of the delegate selection process is not sufficient to transform
party action into state action. Should extensive congressional regulation of national political party activity be found constitutionally
permissible, the necessary nexus between party action and governmental action might be found to exist.70
Third, in each instance where constitutional claims are made
against a private entity such as a political party, the courts must
weigh the alleged intrusion against the high value traditionally
given free exercise of first amendment associational rights if the
party action rationally advances a legitimate party interest. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting
en banc in Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party,7 1
weighed those conflicting interests and concluded that first amendment rights must include not only the right to form political associations but also to organize and direct a political party in a way that
will most effectively achieve its goals.7"
In the same case, the court reconsidered its state action analysis
73 and in Bode
in Georgia v. National Democratic Party
v. National
Democratic Party.7 4 Finding that reliance upon the White Primary
Cases was not persuasive precedent for applying state action to the
activities of a national political party, the court held that a Republican National Convention delegate allocation formula which
awarded "bonus" delegates for Republican electoral victories in a
state did not violate fourteenth amendment equal protection. This
decision is not in conflict with the Supreme Court's position in
O'Brien v. Brown.75 Since, however, the Court, in staying the orders
67. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
68. See notes 35 through 37 supra and accompanying text.
69. See notes 31 and 32 supra and accompanying text.
70. The concurring judges in Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, Civil No.
74-1358 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 30, 1975), 44 U.S.L.W. 2161 (Oct. 14, 1975), did not view regulation
of political expenditures or federal financing of campaigns sufficient to trigger a finding of
governmental action in the context of national convention procedures.
71. Civil No. 74-1358 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 30, 1975), 44 U.S.L.W. 2161 (Oct. 14, 1975).
72. 44 U.S.L.W. 2161, at 2163.
73. 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
74. 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972).
75. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
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of the circuit court immediately before the 1972 Democratic
Convention was to open,7 8 did not address the issue of state action,77
the question is ripe for further analysis."
NATIONAL PARTY RULES AND STATE LAW

States' Rights and the AssociationalRights of PoliticalParties:
Balancing Interests
Until the last decade, the autonomy enjoyed by individual state
parties in adopting systems of delegate selection resulted in widely
varying practices from state to state. This variation was not in itself
the impetus for the reform which set national delegate selection
standards; the incentive instead came from inequities created by
discrimination and procedural irregularities in the systems which
tended to limit access to the delegate selection process.78 It has been
noted that the significance of party rules which set national standards rests in the Democratic Party's rejection of the traditional
notion that the determination of methods of selecting delegates be
left to state parties and state legislatures.'" It should have been
foreseeable that such a dramatic break with past practice would
lead to confrontations between the national party and the states.
The issue of whether state law should be accorded primacy over
national party rules in the determination of the qualifications of
delegates to the party's national convention arose from the unseating of Illinois delegates elected according to state law.8" After the
1972 Convention Credentials Committee 2 voted to recommend to
the Convention that 59 of the delegates elected in the Illinois primary be unseated for alleged violations of the party rules, 3 the
ousted delegates obtained an injunction from an Illinois court preventing the challengers from being seated. 4 Even though the chal76. The Supreme Court stayed the judgment of the court of appeals only three days before
the Democratic Convention convened on July 10, 1972. Id. at 3.
77. See notes 60 through 64 supra and accompanying text.
78. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to settle the matter in Ripon Society, Inc. v.
National Republican Party, Civil No. 74-1358, but denied the petition for certiorari.
79.

MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 17.

80. Schmidt and Whalen, supra note 7, at 1456.
81. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) for the culmination of that challenge.
82. See note 4 supra.
83. The Credentials Committee voted to accept the report of its hearing officer which
found violations of guidelines A-1 (participation of minority groups), A-2 (participation of
women and young people), C-1 (adequate public notice of party activities), C-4 (timing of
the delegate selection process), and C-6 (non-public slate-making). FINDINGS AND REPORT OF
CECIL POOLE, HEARING OFFICER (June 25, 1972) (on file at the Democratic National Committee).

84. For a summary of the long procedural history of the Illinois challenge, see Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 480-81 n.2 (1975).
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lengers were seated by the convention, they remained subject to
contempt of court proceedings for violation of the state court injunction, which was later affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court. 5 The
United States Supreme Court, in an opinion rendered well after the
1972 Convention had adjourned, 8 ruled that in the context of the
Illinois challenge, national party rules took precedence over state
law in the determination of the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to national party conventions. In weighing the interests at
stake in that controversy, the Court relied heavily on the constitutionally protected right of political association, implying a preferred
position for that right when a national nominating process is involved. The Court observed that even had the Illinois challengers
been forced to comply with the state court injunction, no court could
have coerced the convention to seat the challenged delegates in their
place .7
It should be noted that in the Illinois dispute the state election
law 8 was not by itself incompatible with national rules. Nevertheless, a party's right to determine the qualifications of delegates to
its conventions cannot be defeated merely because challenged delegates have been elected according to state law.8" Where state law is
silent, as well as where state law conflicts with a national rule, party
policy will prevail unless the state interest is found to be compelling.
Even though a party cannot coerce a sovereign state to change its
election laws to conform with national party rules, a party's freedom
to engage in political activity at a national convention cannot be
restricted by state lines. It would be illogical to contend that each
state could establish the qualifications of delegates to national conventions without impermissibly interfering with the party's right to
define and enforce its own national policy.90 Party policies have been
in the past9 and could continue to be enforced, when necessary, by
85. Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 111.App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973).
86. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
87. The challenged delegates conceded that neither their own associational rights nor
Illinois' interest in seating the delegates elected according to state law could compel a national party convention to seat them. They stated that they would have preferred Chicago
be without representation at the Convention to having unelected "spurious representatives"
speak for the Democratic electorate. Brief for Respondents 46, Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477 (1975). Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Cousins, agreed
that the Convention could seat whom it pleased, but contended that the injunction should
still have been upheld to prevent delegates from being seated who had been rejected by the
voters in a democratic election. 419 U.S. 477, 496-97 (1975).
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 7-1 et seq. (1973).
89. See also Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 572 (D.C. Cir.), stay granted, 409 U.S. 1
(1972).
90. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1975).
91. For example, in 1968 the Democratic National Convention refused to seat the "Regular" Mississippi delegation elected in accordance with state law on the grounds that blacks
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a convention's refusal to seat delegates who flout that party policy.2
Whether such a drastic sanction is wise policy should also be
considered. The question involves weighing different interests: the
interest of the party in establishing and enforcing internal party law
binding on state parties and the necessity that a national political
party build and sustain coalitions across state lines necessary to
elect that party's presidential and vice-presidential candidates. 3 To
be effective, a party's efforts must be directed toward obtaining
consensus among its constituent groups. Such a consensus should
take cognizance of the reasonable limits of imposing national party
law on an essentially federal system. Expulsion from the convention
as a sanction for non-compliance with national rules should, therefore, be used sparingly and only under circumstances in which less
drastic means have first been tried or where violation of national
standards is shown to be wilfull. Where rules are clear well in advance of the start of the delegate selection process94 and the national
party's determination to enforce them is agreed upon and understood, the necessity of invoking the ultimate sanction of unseating
delegates chosen according to state law should be minimized.
National Party Rules and State Law: A Defense to Non-Compliance
The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, appointed to implement the 1968 Convention mandate to reform delegate selection procedure, expressed the intention in its 1970 report 5
to work with state parties to democratize state procedures. The
had been systematically excluded from participating in delegate selection. BAIN AND PARRIS,
supra note 5, at 323. This exclusion was clearly a manifestation of the enforcement of national
party policy that blacks should not be discriminated against in state delegate selection
procedures.
92. In a complaint filed on Sept. 12, 1975 in federal district court for the District of
Columbia, the State of Wisconsin has requested declaratory and injunctive relief against the
National Democratic Party to prospectively prevent the Party from refusing to seat delegates
elected according to the state's open primary law even though that law conflicts directly with
a national party rule requiring some indication of party affiliation in delegate selection processes. Wisconsin v. Democratic Party of the United States, Civil No. 75-1487 (D.D.C., filed
Sept. 12, 1975). After Cousins, such coercive relief would be inconsistent with the convention's right to seat whatever delegates it decides have conformed with national party policy.
93. This process has been called by a commentator the "vital rites of party integration"
in which factions are reconciled and their differences submerged at the national convention
in the interest of adopting a platform and presenting a unified appeal to the general electorate. F. SORAUF, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 107 (1964).
94. After the 1976 Convention, the Party Charter and by-laws adopted pursuant to the
Charter will govern the delegate selection process. The existence of the Charter precludes the
necessity of adopting new rules to govern the selection of delegates to each succeeding convention. Known policies and implementing rules will put all state parties on notice of what
standards guide party activities. PARTY CHARTER, supra note 9, Resolution of Adoption and
Implementation.
95. MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 16.
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Commission adopted a standard of compliance requiring state parties to make "all feasible efforts" to conform state law to party
guidelines, but it recognized that practical and political obstacles
often prevent the desired legislative change." In the language of
certain resolutions passed by its 1972 Convention, the Party reaffirmed this recognition of the difficulty created by an absolute standard of compliance. The Convention resolved that delegates to the
1976 Convention:
[s]hall be selected through or mandated by Primary elections
conducted by public authority or by other selection processes in
which adequate provision is made to restrict participation in such
elections or processes to Democratic voters. .

.

. In the event that

state law does not permit a state Party to conform with the provisions of this section, it has an obligation to make all feasible efforts
to repeal, amend or otherwise modify such laws to accomplish
these objectives. 7
This resolution was implemented in Rule 2 of the 1976 Delegate
Selection Rules: 98
A. State Parties must take all feasible steps to restrict participation in the delegate selection process to Democratic voters only.
Such steps shall be included in proposed [State] Party rules submitted to the Compliance Review Commission of the National
Democratic Party. Such rules, when approved by the
[Commission] and implemented shall constitute adequate provisions within the meaning of Section 9 of the 1972 . . . mandate.

B. State Parties shall take all feasible steps to encourage nonaffiliated and new voters to register or enroll as Democrats and to
provide simple, easy procedures through which they may do so."
Rule 20 states:
Wherever any part of any section contained in these rules conflicts
with existing state laws, the State Party shall take provable posi96.

Id. at 37.
By THE PEOPLE. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF THE 1972 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION § 9 (1972) [hereinafter cited as By THE PEOPLEI.
98. The 1972 Convention mandated the creation of a new commission to:
A. Review the guidelines for delegate selection incorporated into the Call of the
1972 Democratic National Convention, for the purpose of making appropriate revisions of such guidelines after due consideration of their operation in 1972,
B. Adopt such guidelines as are necessary to fully implement the Call to the 1976
Democratic National Convention ...
DEMOCRATS ALL, A REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON DELEGATE SELECTION AND PARTY STRUCTURE
5 (December, 1973). These guidelines were subsequently adopted by the Democratic National
Committee and were published as the 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15.
99. 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 1-2.

97.

392
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tive steps to achieve legislative changes to bring the state law into
compliance with the provisions of these rules.'10

Thus, when a state party fails to comply with national rules because state law conflicts with those rules, the state party can successfully defend a challenge to its delegation for non-compliance if
it can show that requisite steps were made to comply. A failure to
make these efforts would bar a state party from claiming immunity
to a challenge based on non-compliance.
Even though national party rules have been held to supersede
state law,' 0' there will nevertheless be instances where the Convention will seat delegations not in complete compliance with the Delegate Selection Rules. In such situations, the state party must show
good faith efforts to effect legislative change or take other measures,
not requiring a change in state law, to comply with a given rule.0 "
Treatment of the good faith standard by the Compliance Review
Commission will be a signal to state parties of how rigorous their
efforts to comply must be when this basic conflict exists. The language of the newly adopted Charter points to the possibility that
strict enforcement of national party rules in conflict with state law,
10 3
may in the future defer to the realities of federalism.
100. Id. at 17-18.
101. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
102. The Compliance Review Commission [hereinafter referred to as CRC] established
by the 1976 Rules to monitor state compliance has issued a memo indicating in general what
a good faith effort requires:
While the CRC has not set out specific steps a state Party must take to see that
corrective legislation is enacted, the general understanding of the good faith effort
that must be made includes the following: introduction of necessary legislation;
endorsement of and active lobbying for the legislation by Party leadership (i.e.
State Chairman, State Committee, Governor, Members of Congress, Party leadership in the legislature); active campaign for the passage of such legislation (i.e.
testimony at hearings, statements on floor of the legislature, press releases, newspaper articles, letters to the editor and appropriate state officials).
In some instances other avenues for producing the desired changes may be possible.
State Parties are encouraged to explore these possible alternatives if the required
legislation is not likely to be enacted. The CRC staff will be pleased to work with
you on developing viable alternatives.
Finally, in the event that a state is unable to bring about the necessary statutory
revision, the CRC will look to these attempts and weigh them in terms of the
requirement specified by the particular Rule in question and in relation to Rule 20.
Memo of Information No. 4 to Democratic State Chairmen from Robert F. Wagner, Chairman, Compliance Review Commission, May 13, 1975 [hereinafter cited as CRC Memo No.
4] (on file at the Democratic National Committee).
103. The Charter of the Democratic Party has incorporated similar language which makes
the standard for compliance less rigid:
State Party rules or state laws relating to the election of delegates to the National
Convention shall be observed unless in conflict with this Charter and other provisions adopted pursuant to authority of the Charter, including the resolutions or
other actions of the National Convention. In the event of such conflict with state
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1972

CONVENTION MANDATES FOR

1976

Party Affiliation Requirement
The concept of restricting participation in party primaries to voters who have indicated an affinity for that party's policies and purposes is consistent with the constitutionally protected right to band
1 Since
together for "the common advancement of political beliefs."' 04
one of the purposes of organizing into political parties is to aggregate
interests and to create coalitions in pursuit of public office, it is
reasonable to want to prevent those who do not share those interests
from "raiding" a party's primary and distorting the vote.'"5 The 1972
Democratic Convention implemented this premise by setting a dual
standard for participation in the delegate selection process. The first
requires state parties to adopt delegate selection processes in which
"adequate provision is made to restrict participation. . . to Democratic voters." The second would discourage "excessively burdensome re-registration requirements" by suggesting "frequent and
easily exercised opportunities for non-affiliated voters and new voters to register as Democrats."'0 6 These criteria are designed to maintain the integrity of the Party's primary, while at the same time
confirming a commitment to opening the Party to all those who wish
to identify themselves as Democrats. 107
Participants in the debate at the 1972 Convention on the passage
of the affiliation provision of the Rules Committee Report recognized compelling arguments for and against party affiliation requirements.' 8 Proponents of both positions agreed that voters hostile to Democratic Party policies should be excluded from Democratic endorsement processes. The majority report of the Rules
Committee'019 required state parties to take affirmative steps to establish registration processes for identifying Democrats at least 14
days before the primary or caucus, limiting participation to those
laws, state Parties shall be required to take provable positive steps to bring such
laws into conformity and to carry out such other measures as may be required by
the National Convention or the Democratic National Committee.
PARTY CHARTER, supra note 9, art. 2, sec. 2 (emphasis added). The "provable positive steps"
language was not in the original draft, but was added at the Kansas City Convention in the
form of a minority report on Dec. 7, 1974.
104. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56 (1973).
105. See Note, The Right to Vote and Restrictions on Crossover Primaries, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 636, 654-58 (1973).
106. By THE PEOPLE, supra note 97, sec. 9.
107. See PARTY CHARTER, supra note 9, art. 10, sec. 1. "The Democratic Party shall be
open to all who desire to support the Party and who wish to be known as Democrats."
108. 1972 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION 240-44
[hereinafter cited as 1972 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS].
109. By THE PEOPLE, supra note 97, sec. 9.
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who declared themselves as Democrats. The minority report"' required only that in those states where an identification process already existed, registered Republicans not be allowed to vote in
Democratic endorsement processes. No provision in the minority
report was made for states such as Wisconsin where no registration
process exists, an omission which would have allowed no remedy for
cross-over voting. Since the majority report was adopted by the
Convention,"' it stands as a policy committment to the principle of
Democratic identification as a prerequisite to participation in Democratic Party endorsement processes.
Enforcement of compliance with the affiliation requirement ought
not to impose complete uniformity in an area traditionally regulated
by state law. However, state parties should be expected to meet the
national party standards of "adequate provision" and "all feasible
efforts." In an attempt to clarify those standards the Party's Compliance Review Commission" 2 has described specific examples of
steps a state party could take to bring state law or custom into
compliance with Rule 2:"11
a. each state Party must submit and lobby for state legislation
establishing party registration or legislation that will limit or tend
to limit participation in the Democratic Party's delegate selection
process to Democratic voters only;
b. in the event Party registration is not enacted, the state Party
would be required to adopt alternatives that would attempt to
limit participation to Democrats, i.e., Party affiliation cards, Party
enrollment drives, etc.
c. in caucus system states without Party registration or enrollment, [a state party could] require those desiring to participate
in the delegate selection process to sign a Party affiliation card."
Each state is thus required to include in its proposed delegate selection plan, submitted to the Compliance Review Commission for
110.
111.

Id., Minority Report, sec. 9.
The majority report was adopted by voice vote of the 1972 Convention delegates. 1972
OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 108, at 244.
112. The Compliance Review Commission was provided for in Rule 19. It consists of 25
members, appointed by the Democratic National Chairman to:
... administer and enforce affirmative action requirements for the National and
State [Democratic] Parties and approve or recommend changes in such plans;
conduct periodic evaluations and provide technical assistance to State Parties on
affirmative action and delegate selection implementation ....
1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 13.
113. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
114. Memo to Compliance Review Commission from Robert F. Wagner, Chairman (April
18, 1975) (on file at the Democratic National Committee).
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approval, some provision for party affiliation."' If legislation is necessary for compliance the state party could defend a later challenge
to its delegation, based on failure to conform to national party standards,"' by showing that good faith efforts were made to obtain
passage of the necessary law." 7
A different problem arises when a state party for reasons of tradition or policy does not wish to change non-complying law. In the
State of Wisconsin, for example, cross-over voting in the primary
of either major political party without party identification has been
a traditional practice." 8 Wisconsin law does not compel voters in a

presidential primary to publicly declare their affiliation with the
party in whose primary they choose to vote," 9 and the state party
has up to this time not been willing to take the necessary measures
to change the law. This reluctance would, of course, preclude the
state party from invoking the "all feasible steps" defense built into

the rules.
The State of Wisconsin recently filed suit in federal court'20 in its
own behalf and as parens patriae against the National Democratic
115. For example, the State of Illinois has submitted a plan approved by the CRC on
August 8, 1975 which provides:
2. Participation in the primary shall be open only to Democratic voters. A person
must register as a Democrat by the close of precinct registration (approximately 30
days before the primary), although individuals who voted as Democrats in the 1974
primary or thereafter are automatically so registered.
19. This plan is dependent upon the passage of legislation, presently pending in
the Illinois General Assembly, which is being supported by the State Central Committee through provable positive steps.
DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FOR THE ILLINOIS DELEGATION TO THE 1976 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION (on file at the Democratic National Committee). The legislation implementing
the party affiliation plan has not been passed by the Illinois legislature. Chicago Sun Times,
June 13, 1975, at 16, col. 1. Presumably, to defend a challenge based on non-compliance with
Rule 2A, the State Party would first have to show what provable positive steps it took to pass
the legislation and second, consider alternatives not requiring legislation which would "tend
to limit participation to Democrats."
116. This kind of challenge would be based on the holding of Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477 (1975).
117. Conversely, if no legislation is necessary, then the applicable standard is full compliance.
118. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975, at 37, col. 1.
119. WIsc. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.73(4), 5.60(8)(e)(d), 8.12 (1973). Section 5.60(8) states:
There shall be a separate ballot for each party qualified under 5.62, listing the
names of all potential candidates of that party . . . Each voter shall be given the
ballots of all the parties participating in the presidential preference vote, but may
vote on one ballot only.
120. Wisconsin v. Democratic Party of the United States, Civil No. 75-1487, (D.D.C., filed
Sept. 12, 1975). The complaint invokes federal jurisdiction under art. II, § 1 of the Constitution and the first, fifth, ninth, tenth, twelfth, and fourteenth amendments, claiming that a
threat by defendants to enforce the party mandate requiring state parties to make adequate
provision to restrict participation in the state's delegate selection process to Democratic
voters would deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.
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Party, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the
national party from refusing to seat the state delegation elected
according to non-complying Wisconsin law. However, the national
party rule' 2 ' which conflicts with the Wisconsin open primary law 2 '
was officially promulgated well before delegate selection was to
begin. Furthermore, the principle of party affiliation as a requisite
for participation in the delegate selection process is included in the
Party Charter. 2 3 Clearly, neither lack of adequate notice nor reliance on a different standard, as in the 1972 California challenge,'2 4
create due process problems for the state if the national party enforces the affiliation requirement. Even if Wisconsin can show that
the threatened party enforcement of the rule would constitute state
action, it would still face the Cousins obstacle of preeminence of
party law over state law. Unless the court found Wisconsin's interest
in ensuring open access to party primary ballots by maintaining a
cross-over primary more compelling than the Supreme Court found
Illinois' interest in Cousins,2 ' Wisconsin could not prevail over the
national party.'2
The question of restrictions on the right to vote in primary elections has been most recently considered by the Supreme Court in
the context of challenges to state statutes alleged to confine that
right by unduly limiting cross-over voting. The cases involved
claims by individual voters that state limitations on changing party
affiliation for purposes of voting in a primary infringed their constitutionally protected interest in associating with the party of their
choice. In adjudicating these claims, the Court weighed the state's
interest in preventing "raiding" of party primaries by voters either
indifferent or hostile to the policies of the raided party, against the
voters' rights to associate effectively with their chosen party. In
121. Rule 2A, 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 1-2.
122. See note 119 supra.
123. PARTY CHARTER, supra note 9, art. 2, sec. 4 (v.). That section states: "The National
Convention shall be composed of delegates who are chosen through processes which . . .
restrict participation to Democrats only."
124. See Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 569-70 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also note 135 infra.
125. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
126. In fact the Democratic Party has moved to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
1. Failure to allege a case or controversy within the meaning of article m of the
Constitution;
2. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the U.S. Code or the Constitution;
3. Lack of standing;
4. Failure of plaintiffs to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because
the case involves a nonjusticiable "political question."
Wisconsin v. Democratic Party of the United States Civil No. 75-1487, (D.D.C. filed Sept.
12, 1975).

1976]

Delegate Selection Disputes

Kusper v. Pontikes,2 7 the Court concluded that statutes restricting
a voter's freedom to change his political party affiliation are permissible only if the state's legitimate interest cannot be satisfied in a
less drastic way. In Rosario v. Rockefeller,' the Court gave controlling weight to the state's legitimate interest in preventing raiding
and upheld the constitutionality of a statute which placed only a
time limit on changing affiliation on the ground that it did not lock
a voter into an unwanted party affiliation from one primary to another.
An examination of the holdings in Kusper and Rosario in conjunction with the Wisconsin claim' presents instructive juxtapositions.
In Rosario and Kusper individual voters alleged constitutional deprivations of associational rights by the state, a claim adjudicable by
balancing the individual's constitutional protection against the legitimacy of the state interest. If the state interest prevails, the state
will enforce its law. In the Wisconsin case, the state claims deprivation of its constitutional rights and those of its voters by a political
party. Even though the party can apply sanctions for noncompliance with its national rules, there is no way that a voluntary
association can coerce a state to change its laws to comply with
those rules. Furthermore, the state party has options, other than
changing state law, which could eliminate the conflict:3 0 it could
provide party affiliation cards for primary voting; it could adopt a
caucus system for selection of national convention delegates in
which participants might sign an affiliation card; or it can proceed
with the selection of delegates according to state law and risk a
challenge to its delegates' eligibility under party challenge procedures.' 3' The only sanction available to the party is the power of its
127. 414 U.S. 51, 59, 61 (1973).
128. 410 U.S. 752, 758-59 (1973).
129. See note 120 supra.
130. CRC Memo No. 4, supra note 102, provided that
"in some instances other avenues for producing the desired changes may be possible" and that the Compliance Commission expressly encouraged state parties to
"explore these alternatives if the required legislation is not likely to be enacted
131. Rule 19H provides that:
In the event the Delegate Selection Plan of a State Party is found to be in default
or non-compliance and such default or non-compliance is not remedied by corrective action by the time the first stage of the delegate selection process has begun,
it shall be the duty of the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee to constitute a committee from that State, to propose and implement a
process which will result in the selection of a delegation from the affected State
which shall (1) be broadly representative, (2) reflect that State's division of presidential preference, and (3) involve as broad a participation as is practicable under
the circumstances.
1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 17. The Wisconsin suit names the Democratic Na-
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convention, in judging the qualifications of its delegates, to refuse
to seat those delegates selected by non-complying processes. After
Cousins, the courts cannot compel a national party convention to
132
seat any delegates it chooses, for policy reasons, to reject.
Fair Reflection of PresidentialPreferences in Convention
Delegations
That delegates to Democratic National Conventions should
"fairly [reflect] the division of preferences expressed by those who
participate in the Presidential nominating process' '3 3 is consistent
with the party reform tenet that minority views should be represented at conventions. The underlying policy assumes that voters
should have an opportunity to directly influence the choice of the
presidential nominee. 134 In 1972, the California challenge arose from
a "winner-take-all" primary system in which a plurality of the primary voters could elect all of that state's convention delegates, in
effect, disenfranchising those voters who cast ballots for other candidates.'3 5 The 1972 Convention sought to clarify the ambiguity which
led to the California litigation by expressly requiring "fair reflection" of presidential preferences in the delegate selection plans
adopted for 1976. Although the fair reflection requirement solved
the winner-take-all problem, new problems emerged in defining
what is "fair" and in translating that requirement into specific rules
which could be implemented by the state parties. The new Delegate
Selection Commission 36 chose to interpret "fair reflection" as
meaning that "preferences securing less than fifteen percent of the
votes cast for the whole delegation need not be awarded any delegates.' ' 37 This rule represents a policy decision to limit application
tional Committee's Executive Committee and its Compliance Review Commission as defendants as well as the National Party. Wisconsin v. Democratic Party of the United States, Civil
No. 75-1487, (D.D.C. filed Sept. 12, 1975).
132. See notes 81 through 87 supra and accompanying text.
133. By THE PEOPLE, supra note 97, sec. 4.
134. MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 44.
135. See Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 566-70 (D.C.Cir.), stay granted, 409 U.S. 1
(1972). The challengers claimed that 56 percent of the California voters who did not vote for
Senator George McGovern in the primary were unrepresented at the Convention. This was
undoubtedly true, but the California party leaders had been repeatedly assured that the
"winner-take-all" concept would be considered viable by the National Party through 1972.
Those delegates who were challenged claimed violation of due process based on an attempt
to reinterpret the national rules retroactively. The federal appellate court agreed.
136. See note 98 supra.
137. Rule 11 provides in part that:
At all stages of the delegate selection process, delegations shall be allocated in a
fashion that fairly reflects the expressed presidential preference, uncommitted, or
no preference status of the primary voters, or if there be no binding primary, the
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of the basic proportionality principle in a binding primary, caucus,
or convention. The Commission's intention was to avoid the proliferation of splinter candidates which might result from a literal application of the proportionality requirement."' The Commission
also stipulated that in a non-binding presidential primary, where
votes are cast for individual delegate candidates directly, the votes
for those individuals shall constitute a fair reflection, provided that
the electoral unit from which the delegates are elected is no larger
than a congressional district.'3 9
Whether these provisions conform to the 1972 Convention resolution is not entirely clarified by its legislative history. For example,
as to non-primary states, one observer believes that it was intended
that "fair reflection" be applied at all levels of a caucus delegate
selection procedure so that minority blocs of voters will not be eliminated in the early precinct caucuses.' 4 However, the prevailing view
in the Delegate Selection Commission assumed that strict proportionality was never intended and that preferences need not be
convention and caucus participants, except that preferences securing less than 15
percent (15%) of the votes cast for the delegation need not be awarded any delegates.
1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 6.
138. See TOWARD FAIRNESS & UNITY FOR '76 23 (1973) (a review of the McGovern-Fraser
Delegate Selection Guidelines by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority) [hereinafter cited
as TOWARD FAIRNESS AND UNITY].
139. Rule 11, 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 6. Rule 11 provides:
In states electing delegates in primaries in which votes are cast only for individual
delegate candidates, delegates shall be elected from districts no larger than a Congressional District.
This provision has been called a "loophole," because it can have a "winner-take-all" effect
within a Congressional District rather than fairly reflecting the division of presidential preferences within that district. A plurality of the voters voting for individual delegates in a primary
could elect all the delegates because primary voters are likely to cast all their votes for
delegate-candidates pledged to the same presidential candidate. For a detailed analysis of
this effect, see Memo Election of National Convention Delegates in Non-binding Primaries,
prepared by the Americans For Democratic Action, March, 1975 (available at 1424 16th St.
NW, Washington, D.C. 20036). Regulation 8.48 of the CRC sets out other examples of cases
where the "fair reflection" standard is met:
1. Where votes for those preferences receiving less than 15% are distributed proportionately to those receiving more than 15%.
2. Where those preferences receiving less than 15% receive their proportionate
share.
3. Where votes for those preferences receiving less than 15% are treated as having
no preference or uncommitted.
4. Any combination of the above.
REGULATIONS OF THE COMPLIANCE REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 21-22,
January, 1975 (on file at the Democratic National Committee).
140. Simple majority vote, it is argued, would eliminate some minority views early in the
process and would have a disunifying effect on the party. See Statement of Congressman
Donald Fraser to the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee, Feb. 15,
1974 (on file at the Democratic National Committee).
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.Fairness allows

room for reasonable flexibility."''4

Whether an individual state decides upon a system in which delegates are selected by primary, caucus, convention, or some combination, the 1976 Party Rules require that plans for delegate selection
be reviewed by the national party well in advance of the start of the
process itself.42 Since structural conformity of the state plan with
national rules will have been determined by the Compliance Review
Commission before the Convention, challenges based on a retroactive interpretation of the fair reflection mandate will be impossible
in 1976.14

Even though the fair reflection provision of the mandate will not
always operate to strictly reflect minority views where individual
delegates are elected in congressional districts, credentials procedures require that a challenge to a delegation based on noncompliance with the 1972 mandate would be summarily dismissed
by the Chairman of the Credentials Committee. 44 Such a challenge
141. Statement of Alex Seith to the Executive Committee of the Democratic National
Committee, Feb. 15, 1974. Seith was Vice-Chairman of the Delegate Selection Commission.
He noted in his testimony the difficulty of perfectly reflecting voter preferences early in the
year of the Convention when circumstances may be quite different from those when the
Convention meets. For example, neither Hubert Humphrey nor Robert Kennedy had entered
the early selection process in 1968; in 1972, Sen. Edmund Muskie, an early front-runner, was
no longer a candidate by convention time.
142. Rule 19E provides that:
Each State Party shall submit a Delegate Selection Plan, consistent with the National Party Rules, to the Compliance Review Commission for approval ....
(2) The Compliance Review Commission shall act on the proposed plan
within sixty (60) days. Its decision shall be final and binding.
1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 15-16.
143. The only grounds for challenge in 1976 are:
(1) violation of a delegate selection plan approved by the Compliance Review
Commission;
(2) violation of an affirmative action plan approved by the Compliance Review
Commission;
(3) failure of a state to have an approved delegate selection plan;
(4) failure of a state to have an approved affirmative action plan.
Rule 3(b)(4) RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE OF THE 1976 DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL CONVENTION, adopted by the Democratic National Committee, Oct. 14, 1975
[hereinafter cited as 1976 CREDENTIALS PROCEDURES]. For a chart of the 1976 Convention
Credentials Procedures, see APPENDIX.
144. Rule 5. Dismissal and Decision on the Pleadings
(a) Dismissal. (1) The Chairperson of the Credentials Committee shall dismiss
any challenge, or part of a challenge, which fails to allege a violation, or lack, of a
State delegate selection or affirmative action plan approved by the Compliance
Review Commission. ...
(c)

. . .A dismissal under Rule 5(a)(1) shall be final.
supra note 143. See also APPENDIX.

1976 CREDENTIALS PROCEDURES,
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would fail to meet the test of limited allowable grounds for challenge
based on failure by a state to have had approved or to implement
an affirmative action and delegate selection plan.
This substantial narrowing of the grounds for intra-party
challenges,' 4 5 combined with early clarification and interpretation of
the rules themselves, will not only avoid post hoc rule-making but
should also reduce the number of challenges based on politicallymotivated dissatisfaction with the results of the process, "' rather
than on alleged failure to comply with a specific rule. Since the
practical effect of the rules and their application to individual presidential candidates will not be known until the delegate selection
process has been completed, even-handed enforcement of the rules
through intraparty machinery should be facilitated. When disputes
do arise over implementation of state delegate selection plans, fashioning remedies fair to all parties will in most cases take place well
before the convention meets, since according to Party Rules challenges must be brought promptly after a violation is alleged to have
occurred.'4 7 This promptness standard puts a heavy burden on potential challengers to know precisely when such a violation has
taken place, but should serve to expedite early adjudication of disputes and to eliminate frivilous challenges.
As set out in Rule 11, the principle of fair reflection of presidential
preferences, though likely to result in less precise proportionality
than may have originally been intended, has not been abandoned.
It must be applied by the Credentials Committee when proposing
remedies to the convention when violations have been found.'49 This
provision in the rules for credentials procedures reaffirms the party's
commitment that serious efforts will be made to take into account
145. CREDENTIALS PROCEDURES, supra note 143, at 4.
146. See T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972 162-66 (1973).
147. Rule 3 provides:
(a) A credentials challenge shall be commenced by the filing of a written Challenge not later than (1) ten calendar days after the violation occurred, or (2) ten
calendar days after the selection of any delegate whose credentials to the Democratic National Convention are to be put in issue, whichever occurs first . ..
(emphasis added).
1976 CREDENTIALS PROCEDURES, supra note 143. This is a very strict standard to meet because
a violation could occur without a potential challenger becoming aware of it until the ten day
period has lapsed. In that case, the challenge would be precluded.
148. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
149. Rule 9 provides:
(h) PresidentialPreference of Delegation. Except where a violation is of such a
nature as to vitiate or cast serious doubt on the expressed presidential preference
of the political unit represented by the challenged delegates, any remedy for a
violation shall fairly reflect the expressed presidential preference of that political
unit.
1976 CREDENTIALS PROCEDURES, supra note 143.
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minority views regarding the presidential nominee in the process of
adjudicating challenges as well as in the process of selecting delegates. As long as the Party Charter' remains unchanged, fair reflection of presidential preferences will be party law, and state parties
as well as presidential candidates will have notice of what standards
must be met in the future. The experience of 1976 will undoubtedly
affect the convention decision as to whether this policy goal continues to be a practicable and desirable one.
Affirmative Action: Another Look at the Full Participation
Standard
In attempting to achieve full participation of Democratic voters
in the delegate selection process, party rules must provide adequately for fair procedures, not for a guaranteed result in the composition of a delegation. 5 ' However, the Democratic Party's commitment to openness cannot be measured by fair procedures alone; it
will be tested in 1976 by how rigorously the 1972 affirmative action
mandate is enforced.
The impetus for party reform efforts of the 1970's derived largely
from recognition of the need to overcome the effects of past discrimination which had resulted in gross underrepresentation of certain of
the party's constituent groups in the delegate selection process.,52
Steps toward making a binding commitment to an open party began
at the 1964 National Convention and were reaffirmed in 1968 and
1972.11 Originally, however, this standard merely indicated an
agreement not to discriminate; no specific affirmative acts were
required of state parties until the reform guidelines" 4 were incorpo150. The Party Charter provides in art. 2, sec. 4 (ii) that delegates to National Conventions shall be chosen through processes which "fairly reflect the division of preferences expressed by those who participate in the Presidential nominating process." PARTY CHARTER,
supra note 9.
151. TOWARD FAIRNESS AND UNITY, supra note 138, at 4-6. ("To resort to complex formulas
Id. at 5).
to establish democracy by demography would. . . be absurdly unworkable .
152. MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 26-29.
153. The 1964 Democratic National Convention adopted a resolution which conditioned
the seating of delegations at future conventions on the assurance that state parties would not
discriminate. The 1968 Convention adopted the 1964 resolution for the 1972 Call. In 1966,
the Party's Special Equal Rights Committee adopted six anti-discrimination standards for
the state parties to meet. These standards became an official policy statement of the Democratic Party. Each state party was required by the 1970 Delegate Selection Commission to
include a statement of that policy in its party rules and to take steps to implement them.
Guideline A-I, Id. at 39-40.
154. Guideline A-1 required state parties to overcome the effects of past discrimination
by affirmative steps to encourage minority group participation-in reasonable relationship
to the group's presence in the population of the state.
Guideline A-2 required state parties to eliminate discrimination on the grounds of age or
sex and to overcome the effects of past discrimination by affirmative steps to encourage
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rated into the call for the 1972 Convention as the standards with
which state parties were required to "make all efforts to comply ..... "I While requiring reasonable representation of minorities, women, and young people, the 1969 Commission on Party
Structure and Delegate Selection' 5" disavowed any intent to impose
mandatory demographic quotas on state delegations.' 7
It was nevertheless argued by some that reasonable representation amounted to an attempt to achieve "democracy. . .by fiat,"'' 5
to predetermine the composition of a delegation rather than to facilitate fuller participation of previously underrepresented groups.
Ambiguity in the 1972 affirmative action standard led to confusion
as to the responsibility of state parties. An examination of what
actually was done in 1972 indicates little consistency in the interpretation and implementation of affirmative action obligations. Uncertainty and inconvenience sometimes led state parties to alter the
final composition of delegations by adding members of underrepresented groups to provide reasonable representation rather than to
provide for affirmative action as the guidelines required. Lack of
adequate guidance from the national party resulted in many challenges at the 1972 Convention for alleged failure to include enough
women, blacks, and young persons in state delegations. 59
In 1972, when a challenge reached the hearing stage,"' upon a
showing of underrepresentation by the challenger, the burden of
proof shifted to the challenged to show that " 'appropriate' action
was taken to achieve the 'proper' representation."'' This meant
that the demographic composition of a delegation created a rebuttable presumption that affirmative action had not taken place. The
uncertainty as to whether de facto quotas had been intended, in
spite of the Commission's express disavowal of quotas in theory," 2
representation of young people (defined as those not more than 30 or less than 18) and women
in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the state. Id. at 40.
155. 1972 CALL, supra note 4, at 12.
156. See note 8 supra.
157. MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 40. See also Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563,
572 n.6 (D.C. Cir.), stay granted, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
158.

TOWARD FAIRNESS AND UNITY, supra note 138, at 6.

159. For a full picture of affirmative action problems leading up to and including the 1972
Convention, see Abzug, Segal and Kelber, Women in the Democratic Party: A Review of
Affirmative Action, 6 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 3, 10-13 (1974).

160. Hearing officers were appointed by the Credentials Committee following notice of
intent to challenge and receipt of the challenged party's answer. The hearing officer was
responsible for fact-finding, which was reported back to the Credentials Committee for disposition of the challenge. 1972 CALL, supra note 4, at 16-23.
161. Findings and Report of Cecil Poole, Hearing Officer, June 25, 1972, at 4 (on file at
the Democratic National Committee).
162.

MANDATE FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 40.
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created a situation ripe for clarification. Since the Party lacked any
mechanism for monitoring compliance with the openness standard
before the delegate selection process began, 1972 credentials disputes were adjudicated by the Credentials Committee or by the
Convention as a whole in an atmosphere pervaded by considerations
of political advantage rather than by questions of legal proof.,"
Even though the Party's intent to develop procedures to broaden
participation was clear prior to the 1972 Convention, how affirmative action steps would be enforced was not. In order to clarify the
affirmative action obligation, the 1972 Convention resolved that a
new commission
[glive special attention to implementing through monitoring and
compliance review, the requirement that the National and State
Democratic Parties take affirmative action to achieve full participation of minorities, youth, and women in the delegate selection
process and all Party affairs.' 4
The new Delegate Selection Commission faced the task of devising
rules which would eliminate resort to de facto quotas while strengthening the affirmative action standard. The key was clarification of
the relationship between the composition of a delegation and the
effectiveness of state affirmative action programs. The 1972 mandate required provision for monitoring of state affirmative action
plans so that the effective implementation of these plans, and not
the delegation's final composition, would be the criterion for judging
later compliance with national party standards.
The delegate selection rules for 1976 help to clarify what is now
expected of the state parties:
18. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
A. In order to encourage full participation by all Democrats, with
particular concern for minority groups, Native Americans, women,
and youth, in the delegate selection process and in all Party affairs,
the National and State Democratic Parties shall adopt and implement Affirmative Action Programs. ...
(1) The goal of such affirmative action shall be to encourage such
participation in delegate selection processes and in Party organizations at all levels of the aforementioned groups as indicated by
their presence in the Democratic electorate.
(2) This goal shall not be accomplished either directly or indirectly by the Party's imposition of mandatory quotas at any level
of the delegate selection process or in any other Party affairs.
163.
164.

T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972 161-66 (1973).
By THE PEOPLE, supra note 97, sec. 6C.
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B. Performace under an approved Affirmative Action Plan and
composition of the convention delegation shall be considered relevant evidence in the challenge of any State delegation, but composition alone shall not constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination, nor shall it shift the burden of proof to the challenged party.
If a State Party has adopted and implemented an approved Affirmative Action Program, the Party shall not be subject to chal6 5
lenge based solely on delegation composition or primary results.

It is now clear that emphasis is upon the fairness of the affirmative
action process rather than on attempts to assure a given result. The
"reasonable representation" language of 1972 has been removed and
replaced with a more flexible standard, requiring proven efforts to
include the party's constituent groups. Composition of the delegation will serve merely as evidence, along with other testimony, of
failure to take required affirmative action should a challenge arise.
At least for 1976, the burden of proof rests with the challenger to
show the state party's failure to carry out its own affirmative action
guidelines.' But if a state party has adopted and implemented an
approved affirmative action program, the delegation cannot be
challenged solely on the basis of delegation composition or primary
result.' 7
The rules further provide that a challenge to implementation of
a state plan brought up to thirty days before the state's delegate
selection process begins will be heard by the Compliance Review
Commission.' 8 All other affirmative action challenges will be processed by the Credentials Committee." 9 In the latter challenges, if
the Credentials Committee determines that prompt corrective action by a state party can remedy non-implementation, the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee 0 may issue
165. 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 11-12 (emphasis added).
166. The language of Rule 18A has been adopted in exactly the same form in the Party
Charter, except that the emphasized clauses have been deleted. PARTY CHARTER, supra note
9, art. 10, sec. 6. At the Charter Convention in Kansas City in December 1974, members of
caucuses representing blacks, women, and Spanish-speaking delegates lobbied for removal
of the language, which recreates ambiguity as to who has the burden of proof in a challenge
to a state delegation based on non-compliance with the affirmative action standard.
167. Rule 18B, 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 12.
168. Rule 19F, 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 16. Rule 8(a), 1976 CREDENTIALS
PROCEDURES, supra note 143, at 11.
169. Rule 8(b) and (c), 1976 CREDENTIALS PROCEDURES, supra note 143, at 11-12. In a
resolution adopted by the Democratic National Committee on October 14, 1975, Rule 19 of
the 1976 Delegate Selection Rules was modified insofar as it applies to the jurisdiction of the
Compliance Review Commission to hear certain challenges. The resolution provides that
when Rule 19 is inconsistent with the Rules of Procedure of the Credentials Committee, the
latter shall prevail.
170. The Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee is elected by the
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a compliance order, and the Executive Committee's determination
as to whether there has in fact been compliance will be conclusive
in such cases. 7' The jurisdiction of the Compliance Review Commission, after it has approved an affirmative action plan, is limited
to ordering implementation of the plan or other necessary action to
correct inadequate affirmative action efforts. After delegates have
been selected, challenges can be adjudicated only by the Credentials Committee. In contrast to 1972, the entire challenge process
has been moved further in time from the Convention. This should
substantially reduce challenges which have not been finally adjudicated by the time the convention meets.
The steps detailed by each state's affirmative action plan submitted by state parties for approval will serve as review guidelines for
testing the adequacy of those plans. 7 ' The Commission's insistence
on clear standards is designed to mitigate uncertainty as to what is
expected of state parties and therefore to substantially reduce the
number of affirmative action challenges which reach the Credentials Committee. The proper focus of monitoring and compliance
procedures should be on ensuring enforcement of party standards,
not on stimulating challenges. Because the party made a commitment to govern the conduct of the delegate selection process by an
established body of rules, it was necessary to adopt quasi-judicial
procedures to enforce the rules fairly. As a result, the prospect of
settling disputes before presidential aspirations become vested in
the final outcome of adjudication seems good. Moreover, party law
has a better chance of surviving the vagaries of political change
when adequate provision is made for traditional standards of due
process in settling disputes arising from its enforcement.
Although there seems to be consensus about the desirability of
affirmative action in the delegate selection process, continued contention exists concerning language in the 1972 affirmative action
mandate,' the 1976 rules,' and the Party Charter'7 5 requiring afmembers of the Democratic National Committee and is responsible for the conduct of Party
affairs between meetings of the full National Committee. PARTY CHARTER, supra note 9, art.
4.
171. Rule 8(d), 1976 CREDENTIALS PROCEDURES, supra note 143, at 12-13.
172. The Compliance Review Commission resolved that in reviewing affirmative action
plans, it will approve only those which detail concrete steps that a state proposes to include
in its program. The goal of this specificity requirement is to create objective standards for
reviewing disputes and to facilitate proof of implementation. Resolution adopted by the
Compliance Review Commission, April 26, 1975 (on file at the Democratic National Committee).
173. BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 97, sec. 6C.
174. 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 11-12.
175. PARTY CHARTER, supra note 9, art. 10, sec. 3.
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firmative action in "all party affairs" as well. This language has
been defined in the by-laws of the Charter to include "the first level
of the state political process at which party officials are nominated
or selected, or party platforms and rules are formulated."' 7 6 Problems inherent in monitoring state party activities not directly involved with national convention delegate selection and in fashioning
appropriate remedies for non-compliance with the affirmative action standard in internal state party matters are certain to arise.
The underlying rationale of openness as a desirable goal permeating
the party structure has not been fully accepted by state parties.
Some party officials may well consider this aspect of the rule to
create unreasonable administrative and financial burdens, and
could seek to modify the requirement in the by-laws or to amend
the Charter itself.
Recourse to the courts after O'Brien"7 and Cousins' is not likely
to produce solutions to disputes between state parties and the national party over the scope of affirmative action. The right to require
affirmative action programs is well within the constitutional right
of a voluntary association to make rules governing its own internal
affairs. Furthermore, in the light of the party's express disavowal of
demographic quotas in either delegate selection or other party affairs,'79 a claim of denial of equal protection by those who perceive
themselves as victims of quotas appears unfounded.5 0 Affirmative
action programs are intended to compensate for past discrimination
or indifference by state parties toward efforts to broaden the party's
base. The problem is one of conciliation and compromise among
groups who seek access to political power. The appropriate remedy
for state party officials who find affirmative action rules excessively
burdensome and for those who see such programs as essential to
their aspirations is similar. Those who seek to change party policy
must generate intra-party support for their positions rather than
looking to the courts for relief.
CONCLUSION

The development of party law need not precipitate judicial inter176. Minimum standards for such state programs are to include programs of voter registration, public relations, and public education designed to broaden participation in all party
affairs. PARTY BY-LAWS, supra note 17.
177. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
178. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
179. Rule 18 A(2), 1976 DELEGATE RULES, supra note 15, at 12; PARTY CHARTER, supra note
9, art. 10, sec. 5.
180. See Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 572 n.6, (D.C. Cir.), stay granted, 409 U.S. 1
(1972).
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vention in the settlement of disputes. When consensus exists as to
the goals the rules are to advance and intra-party mechanisms provide for fair adjudication of disputes resort to the courts should be
minimal. Judicial intervention in delegate selection disputes has in
the recent past been encouraged largely by the party's failure to
provide procedures which required adjudication of disputes well before the outcome of the delegate contests themselves could determine the choice of the presidential nominee. Mechanisms for early
monitoring of state affirmative action and delegate selection plans
and their implementation by state parties should correct this basic
weakness. Where the rules are clear and known in advance, the
expectations of voters and state party organizations need not be
frustrated by uncertainty concerning the meaning of party standards, and rights of due process need not be violated by retroactive
interpretation of those rules.
Party nominating conventions provide a means for contending
candidates, factions, and interests to build coalitions and reach
agreement on a nominee and on policy. This function will be better
served if delegate selection disputes have been substantially settled
well before the convention begins. The processes of selecting convention delegates and of settling disputes arising from that process
are now governed by rules which in themselves represent compromises of conflicting interests within the party.
As a commitment to party law becomes accepted by various party
interests and constituencies, the rules and procedures will represent
consensus at any given time. In a real sense, party law is national
party policy, and the courts' unwillingness to infringe upon party
autonomy will minimize judicial intervention in internal policy
matters. The rules which the party chooses to adopt are subject to
change if the consensus which created them ceases to accept their
standards.
PEGGY GORDON*
*Ms. Gordon, a third-year law student, was an elected delegate to the 1972 Democratic
National Convention. She is currently a member of the Democratic National Committee from
Illinois.
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